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THE EVOLVING ROLE OF "FOR PROFIT" USE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW:
LESSONS FROM THE 1909 ACT
Lydia Pallas Lorent
Abstract
The transformation of copyright law from a law that regulated
only commercial actors to one that regulates everyone was the result
not only of technological developments, but also a fundamental
change in the definition of the rights granted to copyright owners. The
1909 Act stands in the middle of this change, with some rights
granted to the copyright owner defined by the 'for profit" nature of
the use and other rights granted without this restriction. This article
examines the reasons for the 'for profit" restrictions on rights
contained in the 1909 Act and lessons we can learn from defining the
rights of a copyright owner with a 'for profit" restriction.
Part I of this article explores the 1909 Act and its legislative
history, demonstrating that the 'for profit" limitation on public
performance rights for certain types of works was meant to preserve a
space for the free enjoyment of music by the public. Permitting a
certain amount of 'free riding" is critical if copyright law is to serve
its constitutional mandate to promote progress in knowledge and
learning. Congress used the defendant's 'for profit" use as a proxy
for those uses most likely to cause commercial harm to a plaintiff In
the end, Congress was trying to shape the rights of a copyright owner
to ensure that actionable infringement resulted only from uses that
interfered with a copyright owner's commercial exploitation of the
work and thereby affected the incentive to create new works. Part II
examines how the judicial interpretation of the 'for profit" limitation
focused attention on the potential 'free riding" nature of the use,
whether or not the use caused commercial harm to the copyright
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owner. In Part III the article suggests that the experience with the
'for profit" limitation under the 1909 Act counsels that to be more
consistent with the incentive purpose of copyright, the law should
require copyright owners to demonstrate commercial harm in order
to prove infringement for certain types of uses.
Copyright law in the United States has always involved a
struggle for balance; a balance between granting rights to "authors" in
their "writings" sufficient to provide the incentive to create and
ensuring that those rights do not stifle the progress copyright law is
designed to achieve. Whether described as designing "leaky rules" or
designing rules that permit a certain amount of "free riding,"' the
copyright law must build in a balance in order to achieve its
underlying purpose of progress in knowledge and learning. The "free
riding" permitted by the Copyright Act is not an accident,2 but rather
is integral to the design of an effective system meant to promote
progress. The rights granted to copyright owners come at a cost borne
by the public in reduced access, use, and enjoyment of copyrighted
works.
How the legal rules define that balance has transformed over
time. At first the rights granted were narrow, and the hurdles
necessary to achieve those rights significant. Slowly, at first, the
rights became greater and lasted longer. A doctrine of "fair use"
developed in the 1800s, 4 pushing back on the expansion of rights and
making sure that the rights remained limited so that progress could be
achieved.5 Today, the rights granted to copyright owners have
expanded beyond the wildest dreams of the founding fathers and fair
use is called upon to do more and more to achieve the desperately
1. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REv. 257 (2007).
2. See, e.g. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (the
ability of others to use certain aspects of a work is "not some unforeseen byproduct of a
statutory scheme." (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
589 (1985))).
3. The first copyright statute in the U.S. granted only "sole right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing and vending" and lasted for only 14 years with a possible additional 14-
year renewal term. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, To obtain these
rights copyright owners had to comply with significant formalities of publication and
registration. Id. at § 3.
4. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
5. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATuRE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW
OF USERS' RIGHTS 66-68 (1991).
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needed balance in copyright law. 6 Many have begun to talk openly
and persuasively of the need for fundamental reform of the copyright
system.
As history shows us, there are many different ways to strike the
proper balance between the rights granted to copyright owners and the
limits on those rights that permit uses of copyrighted work. As we
consider potential reforms, it is healthy to revisit how past Copyright
Acts attempted to achieve that balance and evaluate their success or
failure. One hundred years have elapsed since the passage of the 1909
Act, providing an opportunity to examine one such balance and its
consequences: the requirement that public performances of certain
works be "for profit" in order to infringe.
The 1909 Act differed from the copyright law we have today in
many respects. One fundamental difference involves the significance
of whether or not a defendant's exploitation of a work was
commercial. The transformation of copyright law from a law that
regulated only commercial actors to one that regulates everyone
happened, not only as a result of changes in technological
developments, but also because of a fundamental shift in the
definition of the rights granted to copyright owners. The 1909 Act
stands in the middle of this change, with some rights granted to the
copyright owner defined by the "for profit" nature of the use and
others not so restricted.
Under the current statute, the commercial status of a defendant's
use is irrelevant to a determination of a prima facie case of
infringement. Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines the
rights granted to a copyright owner without reference to commercial
exploitation.8 Instead, commerciality, or more accurately the non-
commercial nature of a particular defendant's use, plays a factor in a
variety of limitations on the rights of a copyright owner, codified in
sections 107 through 122.9 These limitations are generally treated by
courts as affirmative defenses with the burden placed on the
6. Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent
Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 Am. BUS. L.J. 689, 691 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Symposium: Fixing Copyright, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 537 (2007). As others
have observed, the Copyright Act undergoes complete revision every 50 years or so. By that
calculation, the 1976 Act is due for reform in 2026. Many believe the technological advances
experienced over the past two decades means we cannot wait that long. Reform is in the air.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
9. Id. at §§ 107-122. Section 106 makes the rights granted to copyright owners
expressly "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122."
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defendant to prove the defense in order to prevail.'o As an affirmative
defense, non-commercial use might help "save" a defendant from
liability for infringement, but a plaintiff need not prove the
defendant's activity is commercial in order to prevail in a case of
infringement under the current Act." It has not always been that way.
The Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act") expressly confined
some aspects of the rights granted to a copyright owner to only for-
profit uses. The 1909 Act provided the copyright owner of certain
types of works the exclusive right to perform the work publicly for
profit.12 The types of works that obtained these limited public
performance rights were musical works,' 3 and lectures, sermons,
addresses, or similar productions.14 For copyright owners of these
types of works to prevail on a claim for invasion of the public
performance right, they had to prove that the defendant's public
performance was "for profit." Demonstrating the for profit nature of
the defendant's use was expressly a component of the plaintiffs
prima facie case of infringement. Under the 1909 Act other categories
of copyrighted works were not granted a performance right at all, and
one category of works, dramatic works, was granted a public
performance right without the "for profit" restriction. ' This varying
treatment of the performance right is worth considering as we
contemplate potential reforms of the current Copyright Act.
Part I of this article explores the 1909 Act and its legislative
history, seeking to understand the purpose of the "for profit"
limitation. The legislative history reveals three important decisions
with which those involved in shaping the 1909 Act were struggling.
First, was the raging debate concerning whether mechanical copies of
musical works should be within a copyright owner's scope of rights.
Related to the question of mechanical copies was an understanding of
the implied rights that a purchaser of sheet music obtained to perform
a work. Finally, the legislative history demonstrates the drafters were
concerned with the role of appropriate limitations on a copyright
10. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (noting fair
use is an affirmative defense and observing that a defendant would be unlikely to prevail
without presenting "favorable evidence about relevant markets").
I1. A prima facie case of infringement consists of two elements: ownership of a valid
copyright and a violation of at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17
U.S.C. § 106. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir.
2001).
12. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
13. Id.
14. Id. at § 1(c).
15. Id. at § 1.
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owner's rights, particularly as those rights were being expanded
beyond the core rights of reproducing and selling the work. The "for
profit" limitation to public performance rights was meant to preserve
a space for the free enjoyment of music by the public. These concerns
were intertwined with Congress' decision to limit certain performance
rights to only those that were engaged in "for profit." In the end,
Congress was trying to shape the rights to ensure that actionable
infringement only resulted from uses that interfered with a copyright
owner's commercial exploitation of the work, and thereby affected
the incentive to create new works. A defendant's "for profit" use was
a proxy for those uses most likely to cause commercial harm to a
plaintiff.
Part II explores the consequences of the congressional choice to
grant rights to copyright owners that were limited to "for profit" uses.
This part examines the judicial decisions that followed the enactment
of the 1909 Act and the determination of what, exactly, it meant for a
work to be "for profit" as technology changed. The decisions reflect
that a defendant's "for profit" use was considered evidence of "free
riding" by the defendant and thus worthy of an infringement
determination. Subsequent attempts at legislative reform of the
performance right are described at the end of Part II.
Recognizing and understanding the historical development and
significance of commercial or "for profit" use of a work should assist
those seeking to rethink the role of copyright in a fully digitized
world. Would it be best in the technological reality we face today to
limit the rights of a copyright owner to only those activities that are
"for profit"? Part III offers some observations for those considering
potential reformulation of the rights granted to copyright owners. It
suggests that one lesson the 1909 Act teaches is that a limitation to
only "for profit" uses may quickly be broadened by the courts to
encompass uses that only indirectly benefit the user and may cause no
harm to the copyright owner. Such a limitation on the rights of a
copyright owner invites courts to focus on the "free riding" qualities
of a defendant's behavior. Instead, requiring copyright owners to
show commercial harm for rights outside of the core copyright right
may be a better approach.
I. THE 1909 ACT'S INTRODUCTION OF A "FOR PROFIT" LIMITATION
ON THE RIGHTS OF A COPYRIGHT OWNER
The first copyright laws provided copyright owners with a single
2010]1 259
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right: the right to print, publish, and vend the copyrighted work.16
These rights were generally not divisible.' 7 The right to copy, in fact,
was "merely a function of the right to vend the copyrighted work."' 8
This set of exclusive privileges to control the printing and vending of
a work was the core of copyright protection.
Copyright owners sought to expand their rights to include the
reproduction and sale of modifications and abridgements. To ensure
that the copyright owner's rights remained confined to only those
activities that would harm the marketable right, judges created a
doctrine of fair use. As articulated in the mid 1800s by Justice Story,
a fair use was one that did not "supersede the objects" of the
copyrighted work.' 9 In other words, a fair use was one that did not
interfere with the commercial exploitation of the copyrighted work.20
As such, fair uses were not within the rights granted to a copyright
owner. Copyright owners largely confined their lawsuits to those
engaged in activities that would harm their commercial interests,
knowing that fair use would prevent successful suits against others.
This was the state of the copyright law when Congress took up the
task of a general revision at the turn of the Twentieth Century.
The "for profit" limitation that eventually became part of the
1909 Act involves the public performance right, thus some
background on the public performance right is necessary. Congress
first added a right to control the public performance of a work fifty
years before the first general revision bill was introduced. In 1856
Congress provided a federal public performance right, but only for
"dramatic works." 21 Recognizing the nature of dramatic works as
ones that were not sold in copies but rather provided remuneration to
their creators through performance, Congress thought a public
22performance right was appropriate. In 1897, Congress extended the
16. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); Copyright Act
of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
17. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01[A]
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2009).
18. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 5, at 147.
19. L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38-40
(1987) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
20. Id. This is, of course, a vastly over-simplified statement of the fair use doctrine of the
1800s. For a review of the contours of fair use during that time period, see L.Ray Patterson,
Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1987).
21. Borge Varmer, Study No.16: Limitations on Performing Rights, in 2 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 835, 837 (Arthur Fisher Mem'1 ed., 1963) (citing Copyright Act of Aug. 18, 1856,
11 Stat. 138 (1856)).
22. Varmer, supra note 21 at 838 (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4 (1909); S. REP. No.
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public performance right to musical works.23 Congress did not limit
the public performance rights added in 1856 or in 1897 to "for profit"
public performance rights. Rather, these were general public
performance rights.2 4
In the 1909 Act, however, Congress limited two separate rights
recognized to"for profit" uses. Section 1 of the Act provided:
[A]ny person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions
of this Act, shall have the exclusive right:
(c) To deliver or authorize the delivery of the copyrighted work in
public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address, or similar
production;
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a
musical composition and for the purpose of public performance for
profit .... 25
The Copyright Act had not previously provided any public
performance right for lectures, addresses, sermons, and similar
productions, often referred to as "works prepared for oral delivery."26
Thus, section 1(c) represented an expansion of the rights of copyright
owners in those works. On the other hand, copyright owners of
musical works, granted a public performance right less than ten years
earlier, in 1897, now found that right limited to only public
performances engaged in "for profit."
60-1108 (1909), reprinted in 6 E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT S4 (1976)).
23. Varmer, supra note 21, at 837 (citing Copyright Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29
Stat. 481, 482 (1897)).
24. The distinction here is between "general" public performance rights and public
performance rights that are limited by an additional requirement in the prima facie case, such as
a "for profit" requirement. The distinction remains relevant today, although not as the result of a
"for profit" limitation. Today, sound recordings are not granted a "general" public performance
right. Instead the copyright owner of a sound recording is granted an exclusive right in public
performances "by means of a digital audio transmission." 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006). The
distinction between general and limited public performance rights should not be confused with
"grand" and "small" performance rights which concern dramatic versus nondramatic
performances. See Vincent Louis Perrone, Small and Grand Performing Rights? (Who Cared
Before "Jesus Christ Superstar"), 20 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 19 (1972).
25. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
26. See, e.g., Varmer, supra note 21, at 837 (citing Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)).
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A. "For profit" performances of musical works.
The initial draft memorandum bill had proposed a public
performance right for musical works that was not limited to "for
profit" performances.27 This right, after all, had already been added to
the Copyright Act in 1897.28 However, the inclusion of the general
public performance right for musical works in the memorandum draft
bill was criticized by individuals who feared that such an unrestricted
right "would unduly restrict the free enjoyment of music and thus
interfere with legitimate public interests." 2 9 The idea for a restriction
to "for profit" public performances for musical works30 appears to
have been suggested by a representative of the American Bar
Association.3 ' Mr. Arthur Steuart, testified before Congress that he
had "conferred with many of the music publishers" and that "none of
them have any objection to the introduction of the words 'for
profit.' 32 He asserted that this clause would address the objections
which had been made against the public performance right "by those
who think it is too drastic a restraint upon the free use and the free
enjoyment of music." 33 He stated: "The thing to be protected is the
business of the music publishers and not to cut off the public from the
enjoyment of music which can be received or enjoyed by any mode in
which it is publicly performed." 34
In part, the "for profit" limitation in the 1909 Act for public
27. Varmer, supra note 21, at 838 (citing Copyright Office Bulletin No. 10 (1905)),
28. The House Report identified the purpose of the 1897 amendment:
[T]o secure to musical compositions the same measure of protection under the
copyright law as is now afforded to productions of a strictly dramatic character.
There can be no reason why the same protection should not be extended to one
species of literary property of this general character as to the other, and the
omission to include protective provisions for musical compositions in the law
sought to be amended was doubtless the result of oversight. The committee is of
the opinion that the existing law should be so amended as to provide adequate
protection to this species of literary production.
H.R. REP. No. 54-741, at 1 (1896).
29. Varmer, supra note 21, at 838 (citing Hearings Before the House and Senate
Committees on Patents on S. 59-6330 and H.R. 59-19853 (1906)).
30. The "for profit" limitation itself was included in the draft bill, but applied only to
works prepared for oral delivery category, lectures, sermons, addresses and similar productions.
See section I.B. infra.
31. Mr. Arthur Steuart was Chairman of the Copyright Committee of the American Bar
Association. RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 371 (1912).
32. Hearings Before the House and Senate Committees on Patents on S. 59-6330 and
H.R. 59-19853, at 162 (1906) (testimony of Mr. Arthur Steuart), reprinted in 4 E. FULTON
BRYLAWSKI & ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (1976).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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performances of musical works was wrapped up in the battle raging
over control of mechanical copying related to player piano rolls. The
House Report explaining the pending bill demonstrates how the two
issues were linked. After noting that "reproduction of a musical
composition by any mechanical means for the purpose of giving a
public performance is a question upon which light will probably be
thrown by the decision of the Supreme Court," 35 the committee report
turned to the text of the bill. The committee "felt that the public
performance of a musical composition without first obtaining the
consent of the copyright proprietor should not be prohibited in all
cases, but only when the public performance is for profit."36 The
committee did not indicate what, exactly, was meant by "for profit"
but noted that this provision would "simply prohibit the public
performance for profit of copyrighted music without the consent of
the proprietor by any means whatever, whether mechanical or
otherwise."37
The connection between the mechanical copy issue and the
public performance right was even more explicit in the Senate Report
on the pending legislation. In exploring the rights proposed to be
granted to musical work copyright owners, the Senate Report first
took up the issue of mechanical copies. The report justified the
expansion of copyright protection for musical work copyright owners
to include mechanical copies:
The musical composer's work is meant to be uttered in sound, and
if science has discovered a method of reproducing that sound, thus
taking possession of the very soul and essence of a musical
composer's work without the medium of actual printing, the
musical composer is entitled to protection against this new and
more complete form of appropriation quite as much as he is
entitled to protection from a stage performance of his opera or
orchestral performance of his symphony.38
The very next paragraph goes on to note that "[i]n another respect ...
the bill narrows the protection ... accorded to musical
compositions." 3 9 The Report points out that the prohibition against
public performance was limited to public performances for profit and
35. H.R.REP. No. 59-7083, at 10 (1907). The report referenced the then pending case of
White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I (1908).
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. S. REP. No. 59-6187, at 4 (1907), reprinted in 6 E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE
GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 4 (1976).
39. Id.
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that musical composition copyright owners would need to expressly
reserve that public performance right by a notice printed on published
copies. 40 Thus, the "for profit" limitation was presented as a balance:
some new rights were being granted, but some previous rights were
being limited.
The requirement for reserving the public performance right
through a required notice did not survive to final enactment. Its initial
inclusion in the bill, however, is evidence that at the time of the
debates leading to the 1909 Act there was a sense of an "implied
right" to publicly perform a musical work when one purchased a copy
of the work, for example in sheet music form.4 1 In one of the two
cases that eventually led to the Supreme Court's decision in Herbert
v. Shanley Company,42 the Second Circuit noted that "[w]hen the
copyright proprietor of a musical composition sells printed copies of
it to the public, the performing right goes with them." 43 The implied
40. Id.
41. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 n.71 (2002). Many
copies of sheet music expressly stated that the purchaser of the sheet music had a permission to
publicly perform the musical work. See Bernard Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under
Sections 110 and 118 of The 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 521, 523-24 (1977).
This practice was discussed in the hearings:
Mr. Walker. . . . I would like to ask Mr. Victor Herber whether, during the last
few years, he has with his orchestra performed copyrighted music of other
composers, of which copyrighted music he purchased and had the sheets there for
the performance?
Mr. Herbert. With their permission.
Mr. Walker. Did you get any other permission than the purchase of the sheets?
Mr. Herbert. That is included.
Mr. Walker. Did you get any special permission to perform?
Mr. Herbert. The permission is written on the sheet.
Mr. Walker. What is written on the sheet?
Mr. Herbert. Permission for performance.
Mr. Walker. It is on the sheet, is it?
Mr. Herbert. Yes.
Mr. Walker. In all cases?
Mr Herbert. That is, on the comer of the sheets-"permission to perform."
Arguments Before the House and Senate Committees on Patents on S. 59-6330 and H.R. 59-
19853, at 173 (1906) (discussion between Mr. Walker and Mr. Victor Herbert), reprinted in 4 E.
FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
173 (1976).
42. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917). See infra Section II.A.
43. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229, 230 (2d Cir. 1915). Arguably, as
late as 1931, the Supreme Court still adhered to a notion of an implied license to perform a work
from a lawful copy. In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., the Supreme Court faced the question
whether the acts of a hotel proprietor by making music available to guests through a radio
receiver and speakers installed in different rooms, was performing the musical works being
broadcast by the radio stations. 283 U.S. 191 (1931). The case arose in the context of a musical
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right to perform a work that accompanied purchase of the sheet music
is further supported by the fact that the bill presented to the House in
1907 would have required copyright owners to imprint the words
"Right of public performance for profit reserved" on every published
copy of a musical composition."
How to handle the issue of mechanical copies clearly focused
attention on the scope of rights granted to copyright owners of
musical works. Technology had delivered a means for more
widespread enjoyment of music. No longer was a trained musician
needed to enjoy listening to a musical work, all that was needed was a
machine and some perforated rolls. The implied right to perform a
work that accompanied the purchase of sheet music was also up for
debate. Just as technology offered the potential for bringing more
music to the masses, copyright owners clamored for adequate
compensation for their contribution to this enrichment of the public.
The public performance right was part of the considerations for
balancing appropriate compensation and appropriate free use by
individuals in society. As the debates continued and the pending
legislation wound its way through the committees of the House and
Senate, Congress was attempting to craft a reasonable package of
rights applicable to musical works. The "for profit" limitation was
part of that overall package.
At the same time, the public performance right for dramatic
works was not limited to "for profit" performances.45 In explaining
this provision, the legislative history points to Congress' concern with
the potential for certain uses to completely undercut the market for
dramatic works. The House Report notes that the author of a dramatic
work typically did not publish copies of his work but instead "[h]is
compensation comes solely from public representation of the work." 4 6
composition that had been broadcast by the radio without permission of the copyright owner.
Concluding that the hotel, as well as the radio station, was engaged in a public performance, the
Court noted in a footnote that if the initial broadcast by the radio station had been authorized, "a
license for its commercial reception and distribution by the hotel company might possibly have
been implied. But [the radio station] was not licensed; and the position of the hotel company is
not unlike that of one who publicly performs for profit by the use of an unlicensed phonograph
record. " Buck, 283 U.S. at 199 n.5 (citations omitted).
44. H.R. 25133, 59th Cong. § 15 (1907). The requirement to expressly reserve the public
performance right through notice printed on the sheet music was deleted in the subsequent
version of the bill. H.R. 28192, 60th Cong. (1909). See also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 13
(1909) ("Since the right of public performance is as clearly incidental to the general right as is
the right of translation or dramatization and is so treated in the bill, specific notice of it seems as
little requisite as in the case of other subsidiary rights.").
45. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(d), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
46. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4 (1909); S. REP. No. 60-1108 (1909), reprinted in 6 E.
2010] 265
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Congress believed that any public performance of a dramatic work
would have a detrimental effect on the ability of the copyright owner
to make a profit from his work. Only public performances of musical
works that were "for profit" were thought to have that risk. In other
words, the requirement that the public performance of the musical
work be "for profit" was a proxy for those performances that were
likely to interfere with the marketable right of the copyright owner.
The House and Senate Report on the final bill that became the
1909 Act clearly evidence keen awareness of the role of the balance
in copyright law. After clearly stating the constitutional basis for the
Copyright Act and expressly acknowledging that copyrights are
granted "[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for
the benefit of the public . . . , the report turns to the balance in
copyright law.
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider, as has been
already stated, two questions: First, how much will the legislation
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how
much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The
granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and
conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the
evils of the temporary monopoly.48
B. "For profit" performances of lectures, sermons, and
addresses
The reason for the grant of a limited public performance right for
other works, namely lectures, sermons, addresses, or other similar
productions is less clear. The right first appeared in the memorandum
draft bill prepared at the earliest stages of the revision process.49
There is no indication as to why the right proposed was limited to "for
profit" performances. The prior law had provided that "in the case of
a dramatic composition" the copyright owner had the right "of
publicly performing or representing it or causing it to be performed or
FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
S4 (1976).
47. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at S7 (1909); S. REP. No. 60-1108 (1909), reprinted in 6 E.
FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
S7(1976).
48. Id.
49. Copyright Office Bulletin No. 10, at 17-18 (1905), reprinted in 2 E. FULTON
BRYLAWSKI & ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT XXXI-
XXXII, § 37(g) (1976). This memorandum draft bill proposed a public performance right for
musical works that was not limited to "for profit" performances. Id. at § 37(f).
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represented by others."50 The Senate Report notes the performance
right for this category of works was a "subsidiary privilege" with the
rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, and vending"
identified as "the main privileges." 5 The report also asserted that the
subsidiary privileges recognized by the pending bill were "deemed
within the contemplation of existing law and supported generally by
foreign legislation.. .. The House Report merely asserted that the
addition of Paragraph (c) "secures the copyright protection to lectures,
sermons, or addresses, etc., prepared for oral delivery."53 It offered no
explanation for the inclusion of this new right.
As the work on copyright revision continued, the subsequent
House Report indicated that "Paragraph (c) is new, but is believed to
be a wise provision, and it needs no explanation." 54 In the end, the
legislative history for this new category of works is not particularly
illuminating.'5 And, it would not be until the advent of widespread
radio broadcasting, still years away, that this right would be
relevant.56
C. Other provisions referencing 'for profit"
The 1909 Act contained no definition of the phrase "for profit."
In contemplating what Congress intended this phrase to mean, it is
helpful to consider the other instances in the 1909 Act where the "for
profit" or "not for profit" nature of a defendant's activity was
relevant. Outside of the section defining the rights granted to
copyright owners, the 1909 Act referred to the "for profit" nature of
the defendant's activities in only one other place: to define what
constituted criminal infringement.
50. Copyright Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107 (1891).
51. S. REP. NO. 59-6187, at 2 (1907), reprinted in 6 E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE
GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (1976). The use of the word
"privilege" should not go unnoticed. Considering the exclusive grants made to copyright owners
as "privileges" instead of "rights" has a significant effect on how the entire system of copyright
law is perceived. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology Of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets,
And Liberal Values In Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 197-200 (2008).
52. S. REP. No. 59-6187, at 2 (1907), reprinted in 6 E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE
GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (1976).
53. H.R. REP. No. 59-7083, at 9 (1907), reprinted in 6 E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE
GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (1976).
54. Id. at 4.
55. There was some testimony given that, for works prepared for oral delivery, a right to
control performances was necessary as one would not likely attend a performance of such work
more than once.
56. See discussion Part II.B infra.
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Section 28 defined criminal infringement as infringing acts
engaged in "willfully and for profit."5 7 Congress had enacted the first
criminal sanction for violating the federal copyright law less than ten
years before the 1909 Act. In 1897 a provision creating criminal
sanctions for unlawful public performances and representations of
copyrighted dramatic or musical compositions also required that the
infringement be done willfully and for profit. The 1909 Act
expanded the scope of criminal liability to include all types of
copyrighted works and all categories of infringing activity. 59 The Act
maintained both the mens rea element of willfulness and the
requirement that the infringement be engaged in "for profit" to
constitute criminal infringement.60
In addition to using "for profit" as one of the defining
requirements for what constituted criminal infringement, section 28
also provided an exemption:
"[N]othing in this act shall be so construed as to prevent the
performance of religious or secular works, such as oratorios,
cantatas, masses, or octavo choruses by public schools, church
choirs, or vocal societies, rented, borrowed, or obtained from some
public library, public school, church choir, school choir, or vocal
society, provided the performance is given for charitable or
educational purposes and not for profit."
This exemption is odd because it relates only to performances of
certain types of musical works and sermons, not the other categories
of copyrighted works that were granted a public performance right,
and it conditions the exemption on the performance being "not for
profit." If a public performance of any of the works specified were
"not for profit" it would not have been a violation of the rights
granted to the copyright owners, let alone a criminal infringement.62
Thus, the exemption appears to be unnecessary.63
57. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909) (emphasis
added).
58. Copyright Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 482 (1897).
59. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909).
60. Id.; see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness
Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 835, 840-41 (1999).
61. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909) (emphasis
added).
62. This would be true even if the "implied right" to perform the musical compositions
was not applicable due to the rented or borrowed nature of the copies that section 28 references.
If the performances were "not for profit" the activity would not constitute infringement.
63. Indeed, the Register of Copyrights suggested as much in a report related to the efforts
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When trying to determine what "for profit" meant in the context
of an owner of a musical work suing for civil infringement under
section 1(e) for an alleged "for profit" public performance, the
Second Circuit, struggled with the meaning of this phrase in section
2 8.6 The court concluded that the exception in section 28 "must
contemplate the charge of an admission fee."65 If the performance
were really "not for profit, it would be perfectly lawful, both under
section 1(e) and under the prior provision of section 28 itself."66 The
court concluded that Congress intended "to permit certain high-class
religious and educational compositions to be performed at public
concerts where an admission fee is charged, provided the proceeds are
applied to a charitable or educational purpose."67 In an important
study of the "for profit" limitation, undertaken as part of the revision
process that led to the 1976 Act, the author of the study asserted that
the arguments in favor of the "for profit" limitation centered on "the
public interest in certain civic, education, and religious activities."68
In part, the support given for this statement was the express limitation
on criminal sanctions contained in section 28 of the Act.69 In reality,
the legislative history reflects a concern for balance between the
expanded rights being granted to musical work copyright owners and
the "free enjoyment of music," and a desire to bring within the ambit
of "infringement" only those activities that were likely to interfere
with the commercial exploitation of a work.70
II. DEFINING "FOR PROFIT" IN THE COURTS
Determining what constituted a "for profit" public performance,
left undefined by the 1909 Act, did not take long to reach the courts.
Initially, the scope of the public performance right was of most
concern to copyright owners of musical works. While Congress had
granted musical composition copyright owners an exclusive right to
control public performances in 1897,n' enforcing those rights on an
to revise the 1909 Act. See Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the
U.S. Copyright Law, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1199, 1227 (Arthur Fisher Mem'1 ed., 1963)
(calling the provision "entirely superfluous").
64. See generally John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229, 230 (2d Cir. 1915)
rev'd sub nom. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
65. John Church Co., 221 F. at 230.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Varmer, supra note 21, at 840.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 838.
71. See Copyright Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82 (1897).
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individual basis was difficult. Additionally, there was the lingering
sentiment that those who purchased copies of the sheet music had the
right to perform the music. 7 2 The requirement that the public
performance needed to be "for profit" to come within the copyright
owner's control, was simply, another hurdle to overcome.
A. Herbert v. Shanley Company
In 1913, led by New York lawyer Nathan Burkan, musical
composers and music publisherS73 founded the collective rights
society, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP). 74 At first ASCAP attempted to convince hotels and
restaurants to voluntarily enter into license agreements with ASCAP
that would permit them to continue publicly performing the musical
works owned by ASCAP members. Restaurants were not quick to
sign up, believing their performances were not "for profit" as the
1909 Act required.76 It would take several lawsuits and ultimately the
Supreme Court decision in Herbert v. Shanley Company77 to convince
them otherwise and establish the meaning of "for profit."
72. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
73. Music publishers play an important role in the music industry, taking assignments of
copyrights from composers and working to commercially exploit the musical works in whatever
markets exist. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyright, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 673, 683 (2003).
74. Timothy Wu tells a different story of the founding of ASCAP:
In 1913, the legend goes, composer Victor Herbert was dining in New York's
Shanley's Restaurant when the in-house orchestra struck up one of his songs,
"Sweethearts." He complained to the proprietor, who presented him with a theory
of copyright liability: since no admission was being charged, the performance
was not "for profit," and the restaurant not guilty of infringement. Herbert was
determined to prove him wrong and in 1914, with others, founded the ASCAP, a
collection of 170 authors and composers of music, along with 22 publishers of
sheet music. The ASCAP's first target was the restaurant and the performance
that had attracted Herbert's ire.
Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 278, 305 (2004)
(footnotes omitted) (citing EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 41
(David Stanford Burr ed., Thomas Dunne Books 2000); Leonard Allen, The Battle of Tin Pan
Alley, 181 HARPER'S MAG. 514, 516 (1940); and 2 MELVINNIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.19 (1988)). The first lawsuit was filed on behalf of John Philip Sousa's music publisher
against the Hilliard Hotel. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229 (2d Cir. 1915)
rev'd sub nom. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917). Two months after the court of
appeals reversed the lower court's decision denying a preliminary injunction in that suit, the
lawsuit on behalf of Herbert was filed against Shanley. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY 69-70 (1994).
75. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 74, at 69.
76. See, e.g., id.; Wu, supra note 74, at 305.
77. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
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Two different lawsuits were consolidated in this important
Supreme Court decision. The first was the case Burkan filed on behalf
of the John Church Company, John Philip Sousa's publisher.7 ' The
Hilliard Hotel Company had an orchestra playing in the dining room
of the Hotel Vanderbilt in New York. 7 9 That orchestra had played
Sousa's march "From Maine to Oregon" without express permission
from the John Church Company.80 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction against the hotel and the leader of the
orchestra, concluding that the performances at the Hotel Vanderbilt
were for profit.8 ' The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that
"Congress seems to have meant by the words 'for profit' a direct
pecuniary charge for the performance, such as an admission
fee... ."82
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit analyzed the
different sections of the 1909 Act that referenced the "for profit" or
"not for profit" nature of the defendant's activity, trying to reconcile
the potential inconsistency created by the exemption from criminal
liability for certain performances given "not for profit."83
Additionally, the court noted the implied right to publicly perform the
work: "[w]hen the copyright proprietor of a musical composition sells
printed copies of it to the public, the performing right goes with
78. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229, 230 (2d Cir. 1915) (rev'd sub
nom); Herbert, 242 U.S. at 591.
79. John Church Co., 221 F. at 230; Herbert, 242 U.S. at 593-94.
80. Herbert, 242 U.S. at 593-94.
81. John Church Co., 221 F. at 229-30.
82. Id. at 231.
83. The Court of Appeals examined three other sections of the statute to determine the
meaning of "for profit." First, it cited the provision concerning "coin-operated" machines. "The
reproduction or rendition of a musical composition by or upon coin-operated machines shall not
be deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for admission to the place
where such a reproduction or rendition occurs." From this the court concluded that because they
are coin-operated they "are, of course, operated directly for profit." Id. at 230. Next it cited
Section 28 concerning criminal infringement. The mention of "not for profit" in that section was
the focus of the court's concern. Id. The court concluded that:
This proviso must contemplate the charge of an admission fee, because, if the
performance is really "not for profit," it would be perfectly lawful, both under
section 1 (e) and under the prior provision of section 28 itself, We must attribute
a more plausible intention to Congress. We think it was to permit certain high-
class religious and educational compositions to be performed at public concerts
where an admission fee is charged, provided the proceeds are applied to a
charitable or educational purpose.
Id. Finally, the court cited the penalties provision which, it concluded, would make each
performer liable for the performance. Id. at 231.
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them." 84 Presumably, the hotel orchestra had purchased copies of the
sheet music. The Court then stated that "[flor the greater protection of
the copyright proprietor, Congress" granted the copyright owner the
exclusive right to perform the work publicly for profit.85
The district court in John Church Company v. Hilliard Hotel had
pointed to the fact that the musicians playing the music were paid a
fee for their services. 86 From that fact the district judge concluded that
"the hotel would not have paid for the playing of the piece, unless it
were to gain something thereby."87 The Second Circuit rejected this
reasoning by focusing on the effect on the public: "It does not make a
performance any less gratuitous to an audience because some one
pays the musician for rendering it, or because it was a means of
attracting custom[ers], or was a part of the operation of the hotel."
Again focusing on the language of the statute, the Second Circuit
worried that if it read "for profit" broadly to include merely making a
business more attractive, churches that played music would be liable
for infringement and, perhaps even imprisonment "because there is an
expectation that the congregation will be increased by making the
service more attractive."89 Clearly the district court was focusing on
the "free riding" nature of the defendant's activities. The Second
Circuit, however, was focused on the language of the statute and the
effect on the public's free enjoyment of music.
Undeterred by the loss in the Second Circuit, Burkan filed a
second suit two months later on behalf of composer Victor Herbert
against the Shanley Company. 90 Shanley ran a Manhattan theater-
district restaurant with a floor show including performances of songs
from the popular shows of the day.91 Professional singers had
performed the song "Sweethearts" from a Herbert musical during
84. Id. at 230.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 231.
87. Id. Interestingly, the district court relied on an opinion from France involving a
copyright owner who had reserved the public performance rights by printing notices on the
copies of sheet music it sold. Those notices stated that while the public performance rights were
reserved, performances that were "gratuitous" or "absolutely free" were permitted by the
copyright owner. The French court pointed to the defendant's payments to the musicians as
evidence that the "license cannot justify what was done." Id. (quoting Sarpy v. Holland and
Savage, 99 L.T. 317).
88. Id. Presumably, the court is referring to "customers" not "custom."
89. Id.
90. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 222 F. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), af'd, 229 F. 340 (2d Cir. 1916),
rev'd, 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
91. Herbert, 222 F. at 344.
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their dinner performance on April 2, 1913, accompanied by an
orchestra. 9 2 The complaint alleged that the performances were open to
the public and were "not given for a charitable, religious, or
educational purpose, but for the purpose of the defendant's
business . . . ."93 In its answer to the complaint, the defendant averred
"that no charge for admission [was] made to the patrons of its
restaurant, or for the privilege of listening to any performance of the
music therein; that no additional charge is made for meals furnished
in the restaurant at the time when such music is performed over the
charge made when no music is performed ... . The district court
dismissed the complaint.95 Relying on its earlier ruling in the John
Church Company case, the court of appeals affirmed the rejection of
plaintiffs infringement claim concluding that the performance was
not for profit.96
These two cases, John Church Company v. Hilliard Hotel and
Herbert v. Shanley Company, were consolidated on appeal to the
Supreme Court. When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, it had
been only eight years since the case of White-Smith Music Publ'g
Company v. Apollo Company, which involved player piano rolls.97 In
the interim, Congress had passed the 1909 Act.
The Herbert opinion is short, only three paragraphs long. The
first two paragraphs are devoted to the facts and the proceedings
below. The final paragraph contains the court's full analysis of what it
means for a public performance to be "for profit." The paragraph
itself is only ten sentences long. The Court did not concern itself with
the conflict between sections 1 and 28, or arguments about implied
rights to perform a work upon purchase of the sheet music, or the
significance of the paid performers. Instead, citing no authority,
statutory language, or legislative history, Justice Holmes' decision
succinctly opines what "for profit" must mean.
It is clear that the Court was concerned with protecting the
monopoly granted to the copyright owners. The paragraph begins:
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a
performance where money is taken at the door, they are very
92. Id.
93. Herbert, 229 F. at 341, rev'd, 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
94. Id. at 341-42.
95. See Herbert, 222 F. at 344. The case was complicated by the fact that the musical
composition was part of a larger dramatic work, copyright in which was not initially claimed.
96. Herbert, 229 F. at 343-44.
97. White Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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imperfectly protected. Performances not different in kind from
those of the defendants could be given that might compete with
and even destroy the success of the monopoly that the law intends
the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say that there is no need to
construe the statute so narrowly.
Defining "for profit" as the lower court had done in John Church
Company was too narrow a definition. The Court did not
acknowledge that perhaps Congress meant to "imperfectly protect"
this particular right of the copyright owner as a means of balancing
the public's interest in the free enjoyment of music.
Instead of any recognition of the balance for public use built into
the 1909 Act, the Court expressed concern for free riding. The final
paragraph continues:
The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They are part
of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of
the whole is attributed to a particular item which those present are
expected to order is not important. It is true that the music is not
the sole object, but neither is the food, which probably could be got
cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in surroundings that to
people having limited powers of conversation, or disliking the rival
noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating a silent
meal. If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it pays, it pays
out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of
employing it is profit, and that is enough. 9
The importance of this one paragraph to the development of
copyright law cannot be overstated. It has been cited by over seventy
federal court decisions and its effect has even reached beyond the
borders of the United States to influence copyright cases in foreign
countries.' 00 Immediate reaction in the scholarly literature appeared
favorable. o
The Court relied on facts not in evidence to determine that the
public performances at the Shanley restaurant and the Hilliard Hotel
were "for profit." First, the Court believed that the public does, in
fact, pay for the music, through the prices charged for the food, as it
"probably could be got cheaper elsewhere."' 02 There was no evidence
98. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594 (1917).
99. Id. at 594-95.
100. See, e.g., Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. 348803 Alta.
Ltd., [1997] 79 C.P.R. (3d) 449 (Can.).
101. "As a case of first impression it would seem that the decision, although unsupported
by authorities, is correct." Recent Case, Herbert v. Shanley Co., 26 YALE L.J. 417, 418 (1917).
102. Herbert, 242 U.S. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
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cited for this proposition. Next, the Court noted that these types of
performances and others like them "might compete with and even
destroy the success of the monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs
to have."103 The legislative history demonstrates that the monopoly
the law intended the plaintiff to have was not absolute. 10 The
potential harm to the copyright owner of "for profit" performances
was the concern, not free riding by the public.105 In fact, evidence
indicates that the free enjoyment of music was what Congress thought
it was protecting by including the "for profit" restriction. 06 The "for
profit" character was meant to be a proxy for whether the monopoly,
in fact, would be negatively affected. Instead, the Court used the
potential negative effect as a proxy to justify characterizing the
performance as "for profit."
B. Subsequent Court Opinions
The next line of cases to confront the "for profit" limitation
involved motion picture theaters. Harms v. Cohen' 07 was one of the
first to reach the courts. Citing Herbert v. Shanley Company, the
Second Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the
performance was not "for profit" because no separate charge was
made to listen to the music. 08 Rather, the court concluded, the
performance was "for profit."' 09 While Harms v. Cohen involved
silent pictures with live music played as an accompaniment, the ruling
there was extended in subsequent cases involving the playing of
records to accompany silent films,"o and, ultimately to sound
films.I''
Once courts established that restaurants and hotels, along with
103. Herbert, 242 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
104. See discussion Part I, supra.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1922) (music performed in motion picture
theater was not incidental, but "for profit").
108. Id.at 278.
109. Id.
110. Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1929).
111. Famous Music Corp. v. Melz, 28 F. Supp. 767, 768 (W.D. La. 1939) involved a
sound film that was not authorized to include the musical work in question. Had the inclusion of
the musical work been authorized, it is unlikely the result would have been the same. For a
period of time ASCAP sought licenses from film theaters for the exhibition of films and the
related public performances of the musical works they embodied. Subsequent consent decrees
barred ASCAP from seeking such licenses. United States v. ASCAP, Civ Action No. 41-1395
(S.D. N.Y. Jan. 7, 1960), available at http://www.ascap.com/reference/ascapafj2.pdf.
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theaters, were engaged in "for profit" performances, the next
challenge came with the advent of radio broadcasts. The initial cases
concerned music played over the airwaves. In light of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Herbert v. Shanley Company, the courts had little
trouble finding any commercial enterprise engaged in broadcasting
musical works to be "for profit." 1 l2 As one court noted, citing the
Herbert opinion, "[i]t suffices ... that the purpose of the performance
be for profit, and not eleemosynary."' 13 This ruling was subsequently
extended to cover even nonprofit broadcasters who used revenue from
commercial sponsors to defray expenses with private donations
covering remaining expenses.1 14 The broadcast of musical works
during the commercially sponsored programs was "for profit." 15
In 1963, the Register of Copyrights opined that as a result of a
number of court decisions the phrase "for profit" had a "fairly well-
defined meaning." 1 6 The Register stated that "[a] public performance
may be 'for profit,' even though no admission fee is charged, if it is
given in furtherance of a commercial enterprise."'7 If, on the other
hand, the performance were "given by a charitable, educational, or
similar organization, with no motive of private gain" it would not be
"for profit."" 8 One commentator has suggested that "the courts were
in effect asked to choose which interest was more important: the
cultural life of the nation through broad dissemination of musical
compositions or the authors' rights to control the use of their
works."119 Under this conception of the struggle, authors' rights to
control the uses of their works emerged victorious.
112. See, e.g., M.Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923)
(finding department store's broadcasts to be "for profit," noting the periodic broadcast of the
store's famous slogan); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th
Cir. 1925) (finding radio manufacturer that operated a radio station as part of its business to be
engaged in a public performance for profit).
113. Jerome H Remick & Co., 5 F.2d at 412.
114. Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Mem'1 Radio Fund, Inc., 141 F.2d 852,
855 (2d Cir. 1944).
115. Id. (holding that it is unimportant whether a profit went to charitable or educational
causes, the performance was for profit).
116. Report of the Register of Copyrights On the General Revision of the US. Copyright
Law, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1199, 1227 (Arthur Fisher Mem'1 ed., 1963).
117. Id.
118. Id. The report notes that this would be true "even though the performance was part of
a fund-raising event." Id. The holding in Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Mem '1 Radio
Fund, Inc., 141 F.2d 852, 855 (2nd Cir. 1944), however, puts this statement in doubt.
119. Julien H. Collins I, When in Doubt, Do Without: Licensing Public Performances By
Nonprofit Camping or Volunteer Service Organizations Under Federal Copyright Law, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 1277, 1287 n.44 (1997).
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C. Attempts at legislative reform
In response to complaints of unauthorized radio broadcasts of
books and poems, 12 0 Congress amended the 1909 Act in 1952 to
provide copyright owners of "nondramatic literary works" a public
performance right.12' The first bill proposing this right placed the
right in the section that granted public performance rights to dramatic
works, and thus did not limit the right to "for profit" performances.122
The Copyright Office suggested that the right be limited to only "for
profit" public performances. 123 The Copyright Office's concern
related to the consequences of granting an unlimited public
performance right:
This might have the result that a teacher reading excerpts from a
copyrighted textbook in a schoolroom, a minister reading from a
literary work in a church, a scientist at a convention, or a speaker
at a civic meeting would be held to have infringed the copyright. It
may be questioned whether such a result would be in the public
interest.
While representatives of several authors groups criticized the
suggested limitation to "for profit" performances,12 5 ultimately,
Congress included the "for profit" limitation for public performances
of nondramatic literary works.12 6 The House Report reflects the
sentiments expressed by the Copyright Office concerning the reasons
120. Herman Finkelstein, The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 1025,
1062 (1956). The case often cited as inciting this amendment is Kreymborg v. Durante, 21
U.S.P.Q. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), involving a poet who sued Jimmy Durante and NBC for singing
and broadcasting three of his poems. The court dismissed the complaint because:
[u]nder the present Copyright Act, protection against public performance or
delivery of copyrighted works is afforded only in the case of a lecture, sermon,
address, or similar production, a drama, or a musical composition. Other
copyrighted works may be recited in public for profit without infringement. The
point is of some moment, now that radio broadcasting of novels, poems and so on
is widespread. Nevertheless, it is recognized that except as to the classes of
copyrighted works referred to above, the author under the existing statute cannot
complain of public performance of his copyrighted works.
Kreymborg, 21 U.S.P.Q. at 557-58 (citations omitted).
121. Copyright Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 923, 66 Stat. 752 (1952).
122. Finkelstein, supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. Recording and Performing Rights in Certain Literary Works: Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 14 (1951) (letter of Mr. Arthur
Fisher, Acting Register of Copyrights, April 26, 1951).
125. Varmer, supra note 21, at 839-40 (citing Recording and Performing Rights in
Certain Literary Works: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
82nd Cong. 12, 26-27, 36-37 (1951)).
126. Copyright Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 923, 66 Stat. 752 (1952).
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for the limitation. 127
All other attempts at revision of the public performance right
were unsuccessful. There were some proposals to expand the "for
profit" limitation to all categories of copyrighted works. 12 8 Other bills
sought to leave the "for profit" limitation in place but provide
additional exemptions for certain types of performances.129 There
were also attempts to remove the "for profit" limitation, and replace it
with specific, narrow exemptions.1 30 The exemptions sought included
exemptions for public performances by churches, public schools, and
charitable and fraternal organizations. 3 1 None of these attempts were
successful. Until the complete revision of the Copyright Act in 1976,
the public performance right remained limited to only certain works
and for some of those works the right remained limited to only "for
profit" public performances.
The 1976 Act granted general public performance rights without
qualification as to the "for profit" nature of the performance.132 The
House Report on the final bill provided the rationale for the
elimination of the "for profit" requirement:
The line between commercial and "nonprofit" organizations is
increasingly difficult to draw. Many "nonprofit" organizations are
highly subsidized and capable of paying royalties, and the
widespread public exploitation of copyrighted works by public
broadcasters and other noncommercial organizations is likely to
grow. In addition to these trends, it is worth noting that
performances and displays are continuing to supplant markets for
printed copies and that in the future a "not for profit" exemption
could not only hurt authors but could dry up their incentive to
write. 133
Following the 1976 Act, a plaintiff copyright owner is no longer
127. Varmer, supra note 21, at 840 (citing H.R. REP. No. 82-1160, at 1 (1951)).
128. Varmer, supra note 21, at 855 (citing S. REP. No. 72-3985 (1932); S. REP. No.74-
3047 (1935) (expanding the "for profit" limitation to all but dramatic and dramatico-musical
works); S. REP. No. 76-3043 (1940) (same)).
129. Varmer, supra note 21, at 853-54 (citing H.R. REP. No. 71-12549 (1930) (exempting
performances of musical works by "churches, schools, and/or fraternal organizations, provided
the performance is given for charitable or educational or religious purposes, unless a fee is
charged for admission to the place where the music is so used.")).
130. See, e.g., Varmer, supra note 21, at 852-53 (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-11258 (1925); S.
REP. No. 68-4355 (1925); H.R. REP. No. 69-10434 (1926); H.R. REP. No. 71-6990 (1929)).
131. See generally Varmer, supra note 21 at 835, 852-59.
132. Copyright Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 106, 90 Stat. 2541,
2546 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §106 (2006)).
133. H.R. REP. No.94-1476, at 62-63 (1976).
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required to plead or prove that a performance was "for profit" to
prevail in its prima facie case of copyright infringement.1 34
To balance the public interest in access and enjoyment of the
performance of copyrighted works, in addition to codifying the fair
use doctrine,' 3 1 Congress codified a set of exemptions from the public
performance right in section 110. Some of the express and specific
exemptions now codified in section 110 began as proposed limitations
in the course of earlier attempts to eliminate the "for profit"
requirement.' 36 The § 110 exceptions are specific, not only as to the
right being limited but also to the type of work to which the
exemption applied. Some of the exemptions require no "direct or
indirect commercial advantage" be obtained by the performance.137 In
many of the exemptions, however, the "for profit" distinction is
present in the inverse -for the exemption to be applicable the entity
engaged in the performance must be a "nonprofit" institution.138
The Supreme Court has expressly held that fair use is an
affirmative defense.139 Lower courts have further construed the
limitations on the performance right codified in section 110 as
affirmative defenses,14 0 thus placing the burden on the defendant to
prove the elements of any of these express limitations on the public
performance right. Additionally, several of these performance
exemptions are tied to the nature of the entity, not the nature of the
activity.141 Entities that are "for profit" are disqualified from those
134. See Almo Music Corp. v. 77 East Adams, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (N.D. Ill.
1986); LaSalle Music Publishers, Inc. v. Highfill, 622 F. Supp. 168, 169 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
135. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
136. See supra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(4), (8) & (9) (2006).
138. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(1), 110(2) (exemption for certain activities of a "nonprofit
educational institution"), § 110(6) (exemption for certain activities of a "nonprofit agricultural
or horticultural organization"); §110(10) (exemption for certain activities of a "nonprofit
veterans' organization or a nonprofit fraternal organization"). Outside of section 110, other
limitations on the rights granted to copyright owners require examination of the nonprofit
character of the use or entity engaged in the alleged infringement. See., e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107
(requiring inquiry into whether the use at issue is for "nonprofit educational purposes" in
determining fair use); 17 U.S.C §§ I l(a)(5), 112(b), (c) & (d) (2006) (requiring a "nonprofit
organization"); 17 U.S.C. § I 11(f) (requiring a "noncommercial educational station"); 17 U.S.C.
§ 118(f) (2006) (requiring a "noncommercial educational broadcast station" or a "nonprofit
institution or organization").
139. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
140. See, e.g., U.S. Songs, Inc. v. Downside Lenox, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (N.D.
Ga. 1991); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1327-28 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
141. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(1), 110(2) (exemption for certain activities of an
"educational institution"), § 110(6) (exemption for certain activities of an "agricultural or
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exemptions.14 2
III. LESSONS FROM THE 1909 ACT EXPERIENCE.
Following enactment of the 1909 Act, it took only seven years
for the seminal case concerning the "for profit" requirement to reach
the Supreme Court. 14 3 The interpretation of that statutory phrase, done
with no reference to other provisions in the statute or earlier case law,
was as clear as it was broad. If the defendant was publicly performing
copyrighted works and was profiting in any way while engaged in
such performances, the "for profit" requirement was satisfied. The
ease in meeting this requirement meant that copyright owners needed
only to litigate the "for profit" issue when new technological means
of engaging in a performance became available. Beyond the new
technology cases, the issue of whether a performance was "for profit"
faded into the background. Public performances that did not meet the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation were not pursued by copyright
owners. The "for profit" requirement became a non-test.14 4
The legislative history of the 1909 Act demonstrates a concern
for striking an appropriate balance between permitting free enjoyment
of music and allowing copyright owners sufficient protection for their
marketable rights. 14 5 In granting what was seen as the "subsidiary
right" to control public performances, Congress was attempting to
ensure the protection of the "principle rights" was not undermined
through new or different means of exploitation. At the same time,
Congress was sensitive to the rights of the public to enjoy the fruits of
the copyright system, such as the free enjoyment of music. By
focusing on "for profit" public performances, Congress intended to
encompass within the copyright owners' right the activities that were
most likely to cause commercial harm and affect the copyright
incentive.
horticultural organization"); §110(10) (exemption for certain activities of a "veterans'
organization" or a "fraternal organization").
142. "[R]egardless of whether the alleged infringer actually profited from the performance
itself, 'a profit-making enterprise which publicly performs copyrighted musical compositions is
deemed to do so for profit."' U.S. Songs, Inc., 771 F. Supp. at 1226 (quoting Gnossos Music v.
DiPompo, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1539, 1540 (D.Me.1989)). Also an enterprise is considered to be a
profit-making enterprise even if it never actually makes a profit. US. Songs, Inc., 771 F. Supp.
at 1226 (citing Boume Co. v. Speeks, 670 F. Supp. 777, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 1987)).
143. See Part II.A. supra.
144. Admittedly, by shaping the behavior of copyright owners, the "for profit" limitations
was important in establishing some boundaries on the public performance rights of certain
copyright owners. Those boundaries, however, turned out to reach quite far.
145. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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The courts promptly turned this attempt at balancing the public
interest into a focus on the "free riding" nature of the defendants'
activities.146 It is understandable that this would happen. In the
context of a dispute between two parties, one with a right granted by
federal law and one who appears to be benefiting from using a
creative work in some manner, instinct may be to protect the party
who owns the right and construe that right broadly.147 It is difficult in
the context of a dispute between two parties to recognize the public
interest at stake, to recognize the need for balance and Congress'
attempt to strike that balance by limiting the nature of the right
granted. Congress' use of the defendant's "for profit" character as a
proxy for commercial harm caused the courts to focus on the benefit
obtained by the defendant. 148 Because copyright law is not based on
natural law rights, a benefit to a user that does not harm a copyright
owner is a use that should be permitted. 14 9
The most important lesson that we can learn from the history of
the 1909 Act's "for profit" limitation is that if Congress desires to
limit a right to only uses that will affect the copyright incentive,
Congress should avoid the use of a proxy for commercial harm. The
"for profit" limitation was meant to limit the right to those
performances that had the most potential to cause damage to the
copyright owner. 10 Instead, a reformulation of rights that requires a
defendant's use to cause commercial harm to the copyright owner
before it will be considered infringing would avoid the problems that
come with the use of a proxy.
146. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-238 (1918).
147. This is consistent with a restitutionary impulse. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 196-204
(1992).
148. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 584 (9th
Cir. 1944) (holding that "to avoid an unjust course by giving the originator all profits where the
infringer's labor and artistry have also to an extent contributed to the ultimate result, there may
be a reasonable approximation and apportionment by the court of the profits derived
therefrom.").
149. Such use is, in fact, a Pareto improvement. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm,
Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 969, 973 (2007).
150. See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222 at 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE
GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 7 (1976).
151. The nonprofit character of the defendant's use, despite commercial harm shown by
the plaintiff, might be reason to provide an exemption in the style of an affirmative defense. The
justification for such a defense lies in the social policy choice to permit certain uses. For
example, certain performances by a nonprofit veterans group, even if commercial harm is
shown, might nonetheless be exempted based on favoring greater ability for veterans to engage
in public performances of musical works. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (2006) (exempting
certain performances that are "organized and promoted by a nonprofit veterans' organization").
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Some may argue that this is, in fact, what the 1976 Act
accomplished through the fair use doctrine's fourth factor inquiry into
the harm to the "potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."l 5 2 However, by granting a broad general public performance
right to all copyright owners with no limitation on the scope of the
right itself, courts have interpreted the nature of the defendant's
activities as part of the inquiry into affirmative defenses.15 3 By
inquiring into market harm in the context of an affirmative defense,
the defendant must show the absence of market harm, rather requiring
the plaintiff to show the presence of such harm.15 4 The fourth factor
of the fair use analysis is a step in the right direction, but the shoe is
on the wrong foot. Instead, for uses that are not within the core of the
right granted to copyright owners, a copyright owner should be
required to demonstrate the commercial harm resulting from of the
defendant's use. The 1909 Act had the burden in the right place, but
evidence of a defendant's "for profit" use was really a proxy for
commercial harm.15 5
Thus, the second important lesson from the 1909 Copyright Act
is that a limitation meant to confine a particular right of the copyright
owner should be built into the right itself.56 The copyright owner is
in the best position to provide evidence of commercial harm caused or
potentially caused by the defendant's use.157 Therefore, a formulation
of rights that requires demonstration of commercial harm for
subsidiary rights would best be implemented if the burden were
initially placed on the copyright owner.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
153. See, e.g., Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576-579 (1994) (quoting
17 U.S.C. § 107 ("The first factor in a fair use inquiry is 'the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes."')).
154. The Supreme Court clearly places the burden on the defendant when it states that the
defendant would have difficulty prevailing on the defense of fair use "without favorable
evidence about relevant markets." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
155. See generally, Varmer, supra note 21 at 841-47.
156. Arguably, fair use was initially part of the test for infringement and thus not, strictly
speaking, an affirmative defense. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345-49 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) (No. 4,901). It is also possible to read the structure of the 1976 Copyright Act as requiring
that any applicable limitations be disproved by the copyright owner. Section 106 makes clear
that the rights granted therein are "subject to" the sections containing the limitations, while the
limitation sections invariable provide that the limits are "notwithstanding" the rights granted to
the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-07. This is not, however, how the Supreme Court and the
lower courts have interpreted these provisions.
157. Christopher Jon Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 317, 321 (2009).
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Defining what constitutes sufficient commercial harm is not
without its difficulties. Currently a similar difficulty is encountered in
the circularity problem found in the determination of market harm
required by the fourth factor of the fair use analysis. 158 Requiring a
plaintiff to demonstrate commercial harm would shift that problem to
the plaintiff s prima facie case. For example, a plaintiff could attempt
to argue that commercial harm is demonstrated because the defendant
failed to pay the license fee that the plaintiff desires to charge for that
use. As with the circularity problem currently experienced in fourth
factor fair use analysis, the courts would need to recognize attempts
by copyright owners to merely expand their monopoly beyond the
rights granted, versus legitimate evidence of harm that will affect the
incentive to create new works. 15 9 Focusing on the foreseeability of
that harm and its effect on the incentive to create new works would be
consistent with the underlying aim of copyright law.1 60 In judging
such evidence of commercial harm, courts should be more cautious in
the context of subsidiary rights. Copyright law is meant to provide a
marketable right to facilitate recoupment of the costs associated with
the creation of the work, thereby encouraging the investment in the
creation of new works. While it may be tempting to think that "if
some is good, more is better," '6 this conception ignores the cost
incurred in providing more protection. That cost can result in a
reduction of new works created, as well as a reduction in the overall
"progress" that copyright law seeks to achieve.
The final lesson of the 1909 Act's limitation of the public
performance right to "for profit" public performances is more subtle
and yet is probably the most significant. Some rights granted to
copyright owners are the primary rights and should be protected
158. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994);
Princeton Univ. Press. v. Mich. Document Ser's. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996).
Scholars have written about this circularity problem as well, See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should
a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 190-91 (2007);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era ofCopyright
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. I (1997).
159. See Lemley, supra note 158, at 190-91.
160. Christina Bohannan has made this suggestion in the context of the fair use analysis.
Bohannan, supra note 149. See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1569 (2009). Wendy Gordon had suggested such a focus on
foreseeability in the context of requiring a "competitive nexus" for proof of the tort of
misappropriation. See Gordon, supra note 147, at 222-24.
161. Determining what constitutes a derivative work that should be within the control of
the copyright owner is one area where this type of thinking is pronounced. See, e.g., Paul
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRJGHT SoC'Y
U.S.A. 209, 216-17 (1983).
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without a showing of commercial harm. Other rights, however, are
properly viewed as subsidiary rights-extra protection meant to
ensure that the primary rights are not undercut by advances in
technology that permit new uses that supplant the commercial value
of the primary rights. The 1909 Act did this by granting the subsidiary
right of public performance to musical works and works prepared for
oral delivery, explicitly acknowledging the subsidiary nature of the
public performance right. 162 In the context of such subsidiary rights
the law should recognize a prima facie case of copyright infringement
only when the copyright owner can demonstrate commercial harm.
CONCLUSION
As history shows us, there are many different ways to strike the
proper balance between the rights granted to copyright owners and the
limits on those rights that permit uses of copyrighted work. It is
healthy to revisit how past Copyright Acts attempted to achieve that
balance and evaluate the success or failure of those balances. The
limitation to "for profit" public performances for certain copyrighted
works under 1909 Act was intended as a balance permitting some
"free enjoyment" of certain types of copyrighted works, including
musical compositions. Congress intended the requirement of "for
profit" to limit the expanded rights of a copyright owner to only those
activities that would commercially harm the copyright owner and
interfere with the incentive to create. Focusing on the character of the
defendant's use was a proxy for determining commercial harm. The
lessons of the 1909 Act teach us that if we desire to limit the
subsidiary rights of a copyright owner to only those uses that cause
harm to the creation incentive, we should require the copyright owner
to offer some proof of that harm.
162. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
